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negative output trends have deeper structural and institutional roots. They can
be tracked back about a decade to when previous market-reform policies started
to be reversed in favour of dirigisme, leading to further deterioration of the
business and investment climate.
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Russia is better placed to diversify its economy, mostly due to its excellent human
capital. Ruble depreciation makes this task easier.
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1 FROM GROWTH SLOWDOWN TO GDP DECLINE
Recession in Russia has become a fact. Season-
ally adjusted quarterly GDP peaked in the second
quarter of 2014 and then started declining. In the
third and fourth quarters of 2014, the pace of
decline was very slow (Figure 1) and therefore
growth for 2014 overall remained positive
(+0.6 percent, Figure 2). 
However, the first half of 2015 brought an
acceleration of the negative trend. Real GDP
declined by 2.2 percent in Q1 2015 and by 4.6
percent in Q2 2015, compared to the respective
quarters of 2014.
Recession was no surprise. Figure 2 shows that
after the global financial crisis of 2008-09 Russian 
growth did not resume its pre-crisis pattern. From
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2010-12 growth was muted but reasonable, with
annual GDP growth of 5.4 percent, 4.3 percent and
3.4 percent respectively (although from a low level
in 2009). However, already in 2013 – well before
the conflict with Ukraine and resulting international
sanctions, and the oil-price decline – there was
economic stagnation.
To understand the causes of the trend of declining
growth, we must look at the history of the Russian
transition and its partial reversal.
2 THE FIRST TURNING POINT: THE YUKOS
CRACKDOWN 
Russia was never a star reformer. Its economic
transition in the 1990s was long and painful (see
Figure 2) because of the complicated legacy of the
Soviet system (structural distortions, macroeco-
Figure 2: Annual dynamics of real GDP in Russia, in percent, 1991-2014
Source: Bruegel based on Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, Moscow, http://iep.ru/ﬁles/text/RED/2015/STAT-09.15.xls.
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Source: Bruegel based on Rosstat, http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/vvp/tab7a.xls. 
Figure 1: Russian quarterly GDP in 2008 prices, billion rubles, seasonally adjusted, 2007-15
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1. See http://www.ebrd.com
/downloads/research/eco-
nomics/macrodata/sci.xls. 
nomic imbalances and the absence of market
institutions) and because of insufficient political
support for radical, market-oriented reforms
(Dabrowski et al, 2004). Nevertheless, at the
beginning of the new millennium, those reforms
started to bear fruit. In 1999, the Russian
economy entered a phase of post-transition
growth recovery, which accelerated in the subse-
quent years on the back of increasing oil prices. 
Furthermore, the first years of Vladimir Putin’s
presidency (2000-03) brought completion of
many overdue reforms, such as land reform,
simplification of the tax system (the flat 13 per-
cent personal income tax rate), elimination of
fiscal imbalances, continuing privatisation, limited
opening to foreign investors, deregulation and
adoption of several pieces of market-oriented
egislation. At that time, Russia could be consid-
ered a country that completed its basic transition
agenda and managed to build a market economy
based on private ownership, even if  several
distortions and imperfections continued to exist. 
The turning point came in 2003 with politically
motivated crackdown on the largest Russian
private company, Yukos (its assets were subse-
quently taken over by the state-owned Rosneft).
As result, the private sector share of GDP
decreased from 70 to 65 percent between 2004
and 20051. In the following years, this trend of
state takeover continued, especially in the oil and
gas industry. For example, in 2005 Gazprom
acquired the private oil company Sibneft, which
was transformed into Gazprom’s daughter
company Gazprom Neft. The activities of foreign
oil and gas firms were marginalised. The best-
known case was the downsizing of the shares held
by Shell, Mitsubishi and Mitsui in the Sakhalin-2
project in favour of Gazprom (Sprenger, 2010).
While the Yukos takeover did not stop investment
and growth immediately, it initiated Russia's
gradual departure from market-oriented reforms
towards the building of a sort of hybrid system
that is heavily controlled and dominated by the
state bureaucracy and the ruling elite. The tighter
political and administrative grip on the economy
was preceded by a revival of political authoritari-
anism. This included a clamp-down on free media,
political control of the judicial system, the
increasingly oppressive behaviour of various law-
enforcement and security agencies, the increas-
ing control of federal entities by the federal
government, the gradual departure from free and
competitive elections and a party system and the
elimination of other institutional checks and
balances (Figure 3). Increasing government inter-
ference in business activity was part of a broader
process of building the so-called power vertical –
the mechanism of hierarchical control extending
down from federal authorities to regions,
municipalities, enterprises, media and civil
society organisations.
3 THE SECOND TURNING POINT: GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS
The negative effects of recentralisation in Russia
became fully visible in 2008-09 when the global
financial crisis hit. Several emerging-market
economies, especially in Europe, suffered from
capital outflows, suddenly cutting off their
external financing, bursting credit and real-estate
bubbles, reducing demand for their exports and
resulting in falling remittances. However, the
magnitude of crisis-related shock in Russia was
particularly large. It resulted from, among others
Figure 3: Russia: Freedom House Nations in
Transit selected scores, 1999-2015 
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Source: Bruegel based on https://freedomhouse.org/report/
nations-transit/2015/russia and https://freedomhouse.org/
report/nations-transit/2009/russia. 
Note: Each indicator is ranked 1 to 7, with 1 meaning freedom
and democracy and 7 meaning consolidated authoritarian
regime. The Democracy Score summarises sectoral scores. 
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things, massive external over-borrowing of large
enterprises and banks, both private and state
owned, prior to the crisis, declining oil prices and
massive net capital outflow (Figure 4) when global
liquidity dried up (partly because of the inability to
roll over previous debt). 
In 2009, the Russian economy contracted by 7.8
percent (in the second half of 2008 and first
quarter of 2009, the cumulative output decline
amounted to some 10 percent). The exchange rate
depreciated from 23.5 rubles to the dollar at the
end of July 2008 to 35.2 rubles to the dollar at end
of February 2009, despite massive market inter-
ventions by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). As a
result, the CBR’s international reserves decreased
from $582 billion at the end of August 2008 to
$384 billion at the end of February 2009. In the
following year, when oil prices picked up again and
global financial markets stabilised, the exchange
rate partly recovered and international reserves
started to grow again.
As part of its anti-crisis package, the Russian
government offered generous bailouts to troubled
enterprises and banks, via either their direct
nationalisation or through takeovers by those
firms that were already state-owned.
Deteriorating fiscal accounts became a natural
consequence of generous bailouts. Large
increases in pensions and public-sector wages in
the crisis year of 2009 additionally increased
pressure on the budget. As a result, a general
government surplus of 8.4 percent of GDP in 2006
turned into a deficit of 6.3 percent of GDP in 2009
(Figure 5). The federal government's non-oil deficit
increased from less than 5 percent of GDP in 2006
to 13.8 percent of GDP in 2009 (Figure 6).
Although oil prices gradually recovered to above
$100 per barrel in 2010, and the general
government fiscal balance became positive again
in 2011-12 (see Figure 5), the Russian budget and
the entire economy remained even more
dependent on oil prices, compared to the pre-
crisis situation.
4 RENATIONALISATION DRIFT
Subsequent waves of renationalisation increased
the share of the Russian economy owned by the
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Figure 4: Russia, net private capital flows, USD
billion, 2000-15
Source: Bruegel based on http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/
credit_statistics/bop/outﬂow.xlsx. Note: sign (-) means net capital
inﬂows, sign (+) – net capital outﬂow.
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Figure 6: Non-oil primary fiscal balance, % of
GDP, 1999-2014
Source: IMF (2015c).
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Figure 5: Russia, general government net
lending/ borrowing, % of GDP, 2000-14
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2015. Note:
IMF staﬀ estimates for 2014.
state, especially in finance, the military-industrial
and heavy industry sector, transport, communi-
cation and other sectors considered to be ‘strate-
gically important’. As result, more than 80 percent
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2. Partly it can be attributed
to changes in the
Doing Business survey
methodology.
of shares in the ten largest Russian firms
belonged to the state and the three largest
state-owned banks accounted for almost 60
percent of total banking assets at the end of 2013
(IMF, 2014, pp30-33). 
At the end of 2012, the top twelve state-controlled
open joint-stock companies traded on the Moscow
Stock Exchange included (percentage of shares
belonging directly or indirectly to the state in
brackets): Gazprom (50.1 percent), Rosneft (75.2
percent), Sberbank (50.1 percent), VTB Bank
(75.5 percent), the Federal Grid Company of the
Unified Energy System (83.2 percent), RusHydro
(60.5 percent), Transneft (78.1 percent), Interre-
gional Distribution Grid Companies Holding (63.7
percent), Mosenergo (85.0 percent), Aeroflot
(51.2 percent), United Aircraft Corporation (93.4
percent) and RAO Energy System of East (65.6
percent) (OECD, 2013, Table 1, p19). 
As well as listed companies, public ownership in
Russia includes the so-called unitary enterprises
at the federal, regional and municipal levels, and
state corporations (Sprenger, 2010). State unitary
enterprises include Rosoboronexport (weapon
export), Post of Russia and Rosspirtprom
(production of alcohol). The group of state corpora-
tions includes, among others, Vnesheconombank,
Rosnano (nanotechnologies), Rostekhnologii
(defence industry) and Rosatom (nuclear energy). 
The state-owned enterprises are less efficient,
less dynamic, non-transparent, overly politicised
and favoured by government in its regulatory and
procurement activities. The natural gas monopo-
list Gazprom might be the best example of the
negative consequences of government control. Its
gas production in physical volume has stagnated
since its formation in the early 1990s, while its
business model has remained highly opaque and
it often serves Russia’s foreign policy goals rather
than a purely business strategy with the aim of
maximising profit (see Aslund, 2012). 
Several state-owned listed companies were to be
privatised, fully or partly, according to the 2012-
13 privatisation plan (IMF, 2014, p30). However,
the subsequent privatisation plan for 2014-16 set
less ambitious targets. And even those limited
plans are not implemented in practice. 
5   POOR BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT CLIMATE
As result of incomplete economic reforms in the
1990s and then their partial reversal, Russia is not
a friendly country for business, domestic or
foreign. This is confirmed by several international
rankings. In the Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index of 2014, Russia is
ranked 136 out of 175 countries. The 2014
Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom
places Russia at 140 among 178 countries. With a
score of 51.9 in the Heritage Foundation ranking,
Russia belongs to the category of ‘mostly unfree’
economies. For several years, these poor scores
have remained either unchanged or have even
deteriorated. 
The World Bank Doing Business survey offers a
more nuanced picture. In 2013-14, Russia
recorded certain progress in its scores and ranking
(moving up to 62 out of 189 countries surveyed2),
mostly on account of improvements in contract
enforcement, property registration and business
start-up (simplification of registration proce-
dures). However, according to the same survey,
Russian enterprises continue to face serious
obstacles in ‘Dealing with construction permits’
(ranked 156), ‘Trading across borders’ (ranked
155), ‘Getting electricity’ (ranked 143) and ‘Pro-
tecting minority investors’ (ranked 100). 
Similarly the 2014-15 Global Competitiveness
Index (GCI) from the World Economic Forum puts
Russia in the middle of the summary ranking
(ranked 53 out of 144 countries with a score of 4.4
out of maximum 7), with some improvement over
the last four years. Nevertheless, Russia fares
badly under the first GCI pillar ‘Institutions’,
especially in relation to property rights, intellec-
tual property protection, diversion of public funds,
irregular payments and bribes, judicial independ-
ence, the burden of government regulation, the
efficiency of the legal framework in settling
disputes, business costs of terrorism, organised
crime, reliability of police services, strength of
auditing and reporting standards, and protection
of minority shareholders. There are also serious
problems with the efficiency of goods markets, ie
competition (the GCI's sixth pillar) and quality of
infrastructure, especially roads (second pillar).
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Capital flight demonstrates the vulnerability of the
dominant Russian business model: large
enterprises prefer to keep their profits and assets
abroad (via affiliated business structures) while
financing their current activities with foreign
borrowing (see Rogov, 2014). Lack of confidence
in government and insecurity of property rights
are the chief reasons for such practices. 
In the particular context of 2014, the massive
flight of capital of residents and non-residents
reflected a further deterioration of the business
climate, which resulted, among other factors, from
tighter government controls over the media, the
judicial system, civil society and business
activity, in addition to new restrictions on foreign
investors. The impact was compounded by the
nationalist and anti-Western drift in Russia’s
domestic and foreign policy. The US and EU
sanctions reduced substantially the possibility of
external financing for large Russian companies
and banks. Russian counter-sanctions targeted
food products from the EU and other western
countries, and hit consumer markets and import-
dependent Russian firms. 
An additional blow to imports (see Figure 9) came
from the depreciation of the ruble. Overall,
depreciation led to a sharp contraction in domes-
tic demand, which turned the previously observed
growth deceleration into a recession.
The oil price decline revealed another structural
vulnerability of the Russian economy. Although far
from being a hydrocarbon monoculture, like the
Given this evidence of poor governance and
business climate, it is hardly surprising that
Russia is a net capital exporter (see Figure 7), ie a
substantial part of its gross domestic savings is
not invested within the country but is rather
invested abroad (including official reserves).
Incidentally, this shows that a current account sur-
plus does not always reflect healthy economic
policy and a friendly business environment. 
When we look into Russia’s investment data (Figure
8), it becomes clear that: i) the post-2008-09
investment growth was slower than growth in the
pre-crisis period, and ii) its stagnation (in 2013)
and decline (in 2014) signalled looming recession.
6   THE ADDITIONAL SHOCKS OF 2014
On top of the systemic roots of the slowdown that
has been visible since the 2008-09 global
financial crisis, in 2014 the Russian economy was
hit by two additional shocks: i) international
sanctions in response to the annexation of Crimea
and military interference in Donbass (Ukraine), fol-
lowed by Russian trade counter-sanctions; ii) a
sharp decline in the international prices of oil and
other commodities. While these factors had
different origins (the first resulted from Russia’s
geopolitical choices, the second from growth decel-
eration in emerging-market economies and rebal-
ancing of the global commodity market), both led
to an intensification of capital outflows and deep
depreciation of the ruble (see Dabrowski, 2015).
Figure 7: Russia, total investment, gross
national saving and current account balance,
percent of GDP, 2000-14
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2015. Note: IMF
staﬀ estimates for 2014.
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Figure 8: Investment in fixed capital, real terms,
annual percent change, 2000-14
Source: Bruegel based on Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy,
Moscow, http://iep.ru/ﬁles/text/RED/2015/STAT-09.15.xls. Note:
data for 2014 – preliminary estimate.
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3. See IMF (2014) Table 3,
p37; IMF (2015) Table 2,
p34.
4. IMF (2015) Table 4, p36.
Gulf countries, Azerbaijan or Algeria, in 2008-14 oil
exports oscillated between shares of 50 and 55
percent of Russia’s total exports3, and some 25-
28 percent of GDP at current prices. Oil-related
revenue accounted for 11.4 percent of GDP and
more than half of federal government revenue in
20144. If one adds natural gas (some 13 percent
of total exports in 2013), and ferrous and
non-ferrous metals, there is a clear picture of
deep-reaching commodity dependence in Russia.
7   UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS
The macroeconomic data for the first five to seven
months of 2015 is not always sufficient to make a
firm judgement about the current position of the
Russian economy and its near-term prospects. In
addition, too little time has passed since the major
devaluation shock of December 2014 and
January 2015 to be able to confidently assess
how the economy will adapt itself to the new
macroeconomic environment. 
In particular, from the GDP statistics for the first
half of 2015, it is hard to predict whether the
declining trend has already reached its bottom or
if it will continue, and for how long. According to the
IMF World Economic Outlook July 2015 update,
Russia’s GDP is expected to decrease by 3.4 per-
cent over the entire 2015, and increase by 0.2 per-
cent in 2016. This would be a significant
improvement compared to the previous, more pes-
simistic WEO forecast published in April 2015 (IMF,
2015a), which foresaw a decrease of 3.8 percent
in 2015 and 1.1 percent in 2016. The assumption
is that the recession should not deepen further.
However, expectations inside Russia that the ruble
depreciation can lead to fast growth in non-oil
industrial and agricultural output, as happened in
1999, have not so far materialised. A sort of
stagnation at the post-recession level looks to be
the most plausible scenario.
8   MANAGING THE CRISIS
Stabilisation of external accounts
After the dramatic developments of 2014 and
early 2015 (see Dabrowski, 2015), Russia's bal-
ance-of-payments situation has stabilised. While
exports in current dollars have contracted (the
effect of the drop in oil and other commodity
prices), trade and current account balances have
remained positive, because of declining imports
(Figure 9). It is worth noting that Russia’s exports
of crude oil and oil products kept growing in phys-
ical volumes during the first five months of 2015,
compared to the same period in 2014.
Capital outflows have continued, though at a less
dramatic pace than in 2014 (see Table 1).
External debt in US dollar terms has declined
compared to the beginning of 2014 by almost a
quarter (see Table 2), but has increased in ruble
terms, because of ruble depreciation. The major
part of this decline has come from the Russian
banking and commercial sectors, which have
reduced their external exposures (partly because
of sanctions and the resulting inability to roll over
their debts).
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Figure 9: Non-oil primary fiscal balance, % of GDP, 1999-2014
Sources: Bruegel based on Rosstat, http://cbsd.gks.ru/#, balance-of-payments data.
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tistics/Default.aspx?
Prtid=tg. 
6. See http://www.cbr.ru/
eng/hd_base/?PrtId=valint. 
Some respite for the balance of payments also
came from lower outward remittances. In the first
half of 2015, these decreased by approximately
half compared to the same period in 20145 as the
consequence of recession and ruble depreciation. 
Furthermore, introduction of more a flexible
exchange-rate regime allowed the CBR to
minimise intervention in the domestic foreign-
exchange market, which was the major source of
official reserve losses in 2014. The most recent
sales at the time of writing took place in January
2015. Between May and July 2015, the CBR
purchased more than $10 billion6. Overall, CBR for-
eign exchange reserves (without gold) stopped
declining and stabilised at a level above $300
billion (Figure 10).
Exchange rate and inflation
After dramatic depreciation between December
2014 and February 2015, the ruble partly
recovered, reaching its early November 2014
value in mid-May 2015. Then the depreciation
trend returned (Figure 11). In the second half of
August 2015, the exchange rate weakened again,
returning to its January 2015 level. Its fluctuation
resulted partly from short-term changes in oil
prices and the situation in Donbass (ie temporary
escalation of the conflict in the second half of
August 2015). The CBR’s purchases of foreign cur-
rency (see above) are also likely to have affected
the nominal exchange rate. 
The depreciation of the ruble has had a pass-
through effect on inflation. Russia has never
reached a truly low single-digit level of inflation.
Its lowest-ever 12-month level was achieved in Q1
2012 (slightly below 4 percent), but since then
inflation has picked up. It amounted to 6.1 percent
in January 2014 and gradually accelerated to
reach a two-digit level in December 2014 (Figure
12). In the first eight months of 2015, it remained
between 15 and 17 percent. A decrease in the
Table 1: Russia: net private capital flows, in $ billions, 2012-15 
Year/
quarter
Net private
capital flows,
total (2+5)
Banks Other sectors
Net
capital flows
(3-4)
Net acquisition
of financial
assets
Net 
incurrence of
liabilities
Net 
capital flows
(6-7-8)
Net acquisition
of financial
assets
Net 
incurrence of
liabilities
Net errors
and
omissions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2012 53.9 -18.5 14.8 33.3 72.4 101.8 39.8 -10.4
2013 61.6 7.5 27.9 20.4 54.2 138.1 94.2 -10.3
Q1, 2014 47.6 21 21.9 0.9 26.6 29 8.2 -5.9
Q2, 2014 21.8 15.2 7.8 -7.5 6.6 24.2 12.4 5.2
Q3, 2014 7.4 -18.4 -29.9 -11.5 25.7 21.4 -8.4 4.1
Q4, 2014 76.2 29.1 9.8 -19.3 47.1 38.3 -11.5 2.7
2014 153 46.9 9.6 -37.3 106.1 112.9 0.7 6.1
Q1, 2015 32.5 14.1 -10.4 -24.5 18.4 8.7 -8 -1.7
Q2, 20 14.5 2.3 -12.3 5.5 2.6 3.9 -6.8
Source: CBR, http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/credit_statistics/bop/outﬂow_e.xlsx. Notes: a – estimate; sign ‘-’ means net inﬂow.
Table 2: Russia’s external debt, $ millions, 2013-15
Entity/item Dec-13 Mar-14 Jun-14 Sep-14 Dec-14 Mar-15 June 2015
Total 728,864 715,892 732,779 680,857 599,041 555,862 556,185
General government 61,743 53,639 57,128 49,382 41,606 33,556 35,004
Federal government 60,962 52,867 56,446 48,748 41,027 33,043 34,496
Local government 781 771 682 635 580 513 508
Central bank 15,963 15,475 16,225 15,815 10,599 11,673 10,456
Banks 214,394 214,044 208,859 192,250 171,450 154,178 148,959
Other sectors 436,764 432,735 450,567 423,411 375,386 356,455 361,766
Debt liabilities to direct
investors/ direct
investment enterprises 151,288 150,093 160,078 149,967 133,451 127,649 131,015
Loans and deposits 268,402 266,109 269,256 255,669 225,978 213,418 212,579
Debt securities 9,155 8,386 8,703 8,828 6,145 7,598 7,402
Trade credits 3,115 3,445 3,563 3,706 3,469 2,880 2,880
Financial leases 2,105 2,145 2,356 2,408 2,433 2,455 2,492
Other 2,700 2,558 6,611 2,832 3,909 2,455 5,399
Source: http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/credit_statistics/debt/debt_est_e.xlsx 
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7. However, the NWF's
assets are partly illiquid;
they have been  in various
domestic projects.
8. The oil-price decline in
dollar terms has been partly
compensated for by ruble
depreciation. 
12-month consumer price index will only be pos-
sible after March 2016 when the statistical effects
of high monthly inflation between December 2014
and February 2015 will be left behind. However,
this will be possible only if the exchange rate
stops depreciating. 
Two-digit inflation means cuts in real wages,
salaries and other sources of income for the
population. In fact, real income levels already
dropped by 1 percent in 2014. Because of budget
cuts (see the next section), public wages and
salaries, pensions and other social benefits will
not be fully indexed against inflation, at least in
2015-16. However, unemployment continues to
remain at a low level of between 5 and 6 percent of
the active labour force.
Fiscal challenges
Without any doubt, the fiscal situation poses the
most serious challenge to Russia. At first sight,
Russia has no reason to worry. During the oil boom
years, it accumulated sizeable reserves in the
form of two sovereign wealth funds – the Reserve
Fund (RF) and the National Wealth Fund (NWF)
(Figures 13-14). Although seriously depleted
during the global financial crisis (especially the RF
– see Figure 13), the funds were partly rebuilt in
2012-13. Even after spending some of these
resources during the current (2014-15) crisis, their
size remains substantial – each representing
approximately 6 percent of GDP7.
At the same time, Russia's general government
gross debt amounted to only 17.8 percent of GDP
in 2014 (IMF, 2014b, Table 4, p36), a level much
lower than most advanced and emerging-market
economies.
However, the US and EU sanctions make it impos-
sible for Russia to borrow on international
markets. Therefore, Russia can only rely on its
accumulated fiscal reserves and domestic
borrowing to finance fiscal deficits. Domestic bor-
rowing will remain limited because of the
insufficient depth of the domestic financial
market, limited trust in the ruble and fragility of
part of the banking sector.
According to the IMF forecast (IMF, 2015b, Table 4,
p36), Russia's general government deficit will
amount to 4.8 percent of GDP in 2015, and the
federal government deficit will be 3.5 percent of GDP.
Practically the entire revenue shortfall will be made
up from the oil-related sources: minus 2.9 percent-
age points of GDP compared to 20148. In addition,
general government expenditure will expand by
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Figure 10: Russia’s international reserves in $
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in percent, 2014-15 
Source: CBR (2015), Table 6, p61.
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more than one percentage point of GDP, mainly
because of a shrinking denominator (real GDP).
Without further fiscal adjustment the RF will
become depleted in 2017, and the NWF will suffer
the same fate a year or two later. Russia’s Ministry
of Finance aims to avoid this and has advocated
serious expenditure cuts in the 2016 budget9.
They might involve, among others options, limited
indexation of public wages and salaries, pensions
and social benefits; rationalisation of employment
in public administration and the public healthcare
sector; restricting the list of health services and
procedures financed from public sources; cuts to
space programmes; and further cuts in public
investment projects, including those related to the
2018 football World Cup. Military expenditure will
be less affected, though it is likely that it will not
increase further in nominal terms. 
Apart from short-term expenditure cuts, there are
also discussions about increasing the statutory
and actual retirement age (one of the lowest in
Europe), cutting pension privileges related to
individual sectors and professions, and limiting
the possibility of combining pensioner status with
continuing employment. Economically, these are
the right solutions (especially when considering
the unfavourable demographics trends), but they
face political resistance both inside the govern-
ment and in the Duma (the lower house of the
Russian parliament). 
Cutting direct and indirect energy subsidies and
returning to privatisation could offer additional
support to the budget, but these measures are not
currently being debated.
9   HOW RETURN TO ECONOMIC GROWTH?
Even if the Russian economy has already reached
its lowest point, a more fundamental question of
how to return to sustainable economic growth at
reasonable rate remains open. 
In the short term, much will depend on oil prices
and the political ability to resolve the Ukrainian
conflict. Higher oil prices, for example $60-70 per
barrel and a relaxation of the sanctions regime
could provide Russia’s economy and budget with a
certain respite and could ease somewhat the
largely negative perception of the business
climate. In addition, continuation of conservative
monetary and fiscal policies can help to prevent
new episodes of macroeconomic turbulence of the
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Figure 13: Reserve Fund, $ billions, 2008-15
Source: Bruegel based on http://old.minﬁn.ru/en/reservefund/statistics/amount/index.php?id_4=5817. 
9. See http://tass.ru/
ekonomika/2280039
(in Russian).  
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sort observed at the end of 2014 and in early 2015
(see Dabrowski, 2015). This would also be impor-
tant for output stabilisation and potential recovery.
In the medium-to-long term however, Russia
must address its fundamental structural and
institutional disadvantages: the high degree of
oil and commodity dependence, and the
unfriendly business and investment climate,
underpinned by poor governance. 
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Compared to many other commodity producers,
Russia has a greater chance to diversify its
economy, mostly because of its excellent human
capital. Ruble depreciation makes this task easier.
Whether such a diversification will materialise
depends, however, on improving the business and
investment climate and stopping the authoritar-
ian drift in domestic politics and geopolitical con-
frontation with the west and Russia's neighbours.
